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FREEHOLDER REQUIREMENTS IN THE MONTANA
CODE ANNOTATED: UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION
Charles G. Hammond
The true reason of requiring any qualification with regard to
property in voters is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a
situation as to be esteemed to have no will of their own.'
As the comment above indicates, eminent legal scholar Sir Wil-
liam Blackstone did not consider strength of character to be among
the virtues of the non-landowner. Blackstone was not alone. Eight-
eenth century political theorists, citing Aristotle, Cato, Cicero, and
Pliny, extolled the virtues of the freeholder,2 who would have "a
common interest in and a permanent attachment to society and
the state. ' '3 During the formation of the American republic the in-
fluence of these theorists led to the adoption of restrictive limits on
the right of political participation,' including confining voting, can-
didacy, and petitioning to the landowner.
The same theories inspired Montana lawmakers. Witness
Judge Pigott's comments in an 1899 case contesting David Swee-
ney's election as the Mayor of Niehart, Montana:
The Legislature doubtless intended to proscribe such requi-
sites for eligibility to mayoralty as would tend to prevent those
having no substantial interest in the well-being and prosperity of
a municipality from holding its chief executive office.'
Despite recent United States Supreme Court decisions discourag-
ing the use of property ownership as a measure of character, Mon-
tana's codes still contain many statutes which condition political
participation upon freeholder status.
1. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 171 (1771-1773).
2. Freeholder is defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 598 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979) as "[olne
having title to realty." Montana's definition is similar. See MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [here-
inafter cited as MCA] §§ 7-2-4704(3), 70-15-206 (1979); Brodie v. City of Missoula, 155
Mont. 185, 193, 468 P.2d 778, 782-83 (1970). A freeholder is a landowner, and the two terms
will be used interchangeably in this comment.
3. C. WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860, at 5
(1960).
4. Although there is no specific right of political participation, the term is used to
describe the privilege to engage in political activity without invidious state restrictions. See
generally Leclerq, The Emerging Federally Secured Right of Political Participation, 8 IND. L.
REv. 607 (1975).
5. Mayer v. Sweeney, 22 Mont. 103, 105, 55 P. 913, 914 (1899).
6. There are now approximately 50 such statutes in the MCA. The 1979 Legislature
1
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This comment discusses Montana freeholder statutes which re-
strict political participation in three areas: voting, candidacy, and
petitioning.! Constitutional authority for freeholder restrictions is
examined. Constitutional objections are discussed, first in theoreti-
cal terms and then as applied. Succeeding sections focus on voting,
candidacy, and petitioning restrictions, distinguishing each by its
special legal treatment. This comment contends that nearly all of
these statutes are unconstitutional.8 Montana's legislature should
remove the freeholder restrictions from them, thereby continuing
the statutory reform begun by the recent recodification.1
I. RESTRICTIONS ON AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
A freeholder requirement is one of many restrictions placed on
the ability of Americans to participate in what is called popular
democracy. These restrictions include bona fide and durational
residency," age," religious,'" sex, 3 race," and wealth'5 qualifica-
repealed or removed freeholder restrictions from nine statutes, including MCA §§ 7-2-
4601(2), -3-4346(1), -4-4301(1)(a), -4401(1), -5-4321(2), -6-2344(1), -4431(1), -14-4404, -35-
2108(2) (1979). In most statutes, the freeholder restriction was replaced with a requirement
that a voter or candidate need only be a "qualified elector." MCA § 13-1-101(6) (1979)
equates "elector" with "voter," and MCA § 13-1-111 (1979) sets forth voter qualifications.
7. Montana freeholder statutes were discovered with the help of a computer search of
the MCA which listed all the statutes containing the word "freeholder." This service is
available through the Montana Department of Community Affairs, Capitol Station, Helena,
Montana 59601. This technique does not identify all statutes which impose property restric-
tions. For example, MCA § 7-35-2101(1)(a) (1979) imposes a freeholder restriction without
using the word "freeholder."
8. This comment deals only with political participation statutes. There are many other
freeholder restrictions. See, e.g., MCA §§ 2-9-507(1), 27-16-205, -403(1), -17-309, -18-722, 33-
26-102, -104(1), 46-9-403(3) (1979) which require sureties to be freeholders or householders;
MCA § 7-14-4203(1) (1979) which allows only freeholders to appraise damages caused by
street grade change if city and adjoining landowner cannot agree; MCA §§ 7-21-2306(2)(a), -
2407(3)(a) (1979) requiring itinerant vendors and transient retail merchants to be bonded by
surety companies or two responsible freeholders; MCA § 69-14-1002(1) (1979) which allows
freeholder railroad employees reimbursement for decrease in residence values caused by rail-
road terminal location changes; MCA § 70-32-206(1) (1979) which allows only freeholders to
appraise the value of the household exempt from execution; MCA § 81-4-601 (1979) which
allows only freeholders or resident stock owners to identify estrays.
9. See Dowling, The Creation of the Montana Code Annotated, 40 MONT. L. REV. 1, 16
(1979).
10. See, e.g., MCA § 13-1-111(1)(c) (1979) which requires voters to be Montana re-
sidents, and residents of the county in which they vote for 30 days.
11. See, e.g., MCA § 13-1-111(1)(b) (1979) which requires voters to be at least 18 years
old.
12. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VI (1777), reprinted in 2 THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS,
CONSrrMuoNs AND ORGANIC LAWs 799 (1906) [hereinafter cited as THORPE], which required
Georgia representatives to be Protestants.
13. See, e.g., PA. CONST. § 6 (1776), reprinted in 7 THORPE 3813, which gave men the right
of suffrage.
14. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1879), reprinted in 1 THORPE 415, which denied 2
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tions. This section of the comment traces the history of American
political participation restrictions, their constitutional bases, and
their limits.
A. Constitutional Authority
As the introduction indicates, the idea that all men are not
equal did not originate with the founders of our country. Despite
the popular view that the American revolution created a democ-
racy where all could participate in government, these restrictive
political theories led to the belief that some mechanism for regula-
tion of elections was necessary." Thus the federal constitution con-
tains bona fide and durational residency, citizenship, and age re-
strictions for federal political candidates." Most of the power to
regulate elections was left to the states, 8 however, and early Amer-
ican statesmen used this power and the restrictive political theories
described above to fashion many limits on popular political partici-
pation. Every state has extensively regulated the right to vote or to
be a candidate. 9 Most of these restrictions remained intact until
the 1960's, when the Warren Court struck many of them down.20
Montana law reflects the impact of these restrictive political
theories. Montana's first constitution imposed age, durational resi-
dency, and citizenship requirements on voters2' and candidates, 2
and a taxpayer requirement on voters in any election concerning
the creation of any levy, debt, or liability. 23 More important, the
1889 Constitution specifically gave the Montana Legislature the
voting to Chinese, idiots, criminals, and embezzlers.
15. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. arts. III, IV (1776), reprinted in 5 THORPE 2595, which
required voters to be worth at least 50 pounds, assembly members at least 500 pounds, and
legislative council members at least 1000 pounds.
16. The practical problems of conducting elections are another consideration. E.g.,
states may require persons to meet certain reasonable voting requirements, Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969); candidacy restrictions limiting the size of the
ballot reduce voter confusion, Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732 (1974); candidacy restric-
tions preserve the integrity of the electoral process by reducing the potential for frivolous
candidacies, American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781-85 (1974); states have the
duty to protect the integrity of the political process from frivolous candidacies, Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (representatives); § 3, cl. 3 (senators); art. II, § 1,
cl. 5 (president).
18. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; § 4, cl. 1 which allows state legislatures
to impose qualifications on federal elections but provides that Congress may override them.
19. Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 Hav. L. REv. 1111, 1115 (1975). This
article also contains an exhaustive summary of various state restrictions.
20. Leclerq, supra note 4, at 617.
21. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1889).
22. Id. §§ 7, 11.
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power to impose any other restrictions "necessary to secure the pu-
rity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective
franchise."24 Under the 1889 Constitution, Montana legislatures en-
acted numerous statutes restricting political participation, includ-
ing the freeholder statutes which are the subject of this comment. 5
Freeholder restrictions vary widely in operation and applica-
tion. Most of Montana's freeholder statutes set no minimum land-
owning requirement" and could be satisfied by owning even the
smallest amount of land.Y By contrast, the Maryland statute inval-
idated in Davis v. Miller2 required the ownership of real property
worth at least $2,000. Montana's freeholder statutes apply in many
situations. For example, only freeholders may become trustees of
cemetery care and improvement associations2' or citizen members
of city-county planning boards." Only freeholders may vote in agri-
cultural association elections.3' Montana citizens may not petition
to extend county roads 2 or to create rural fire districts" unless they
own land. In short, Montana law forecloses significant opportuni-
ties for those who do not own land. Most of these restrictions ap-
pear to be unconstitutional; the next part of this comment exam-
ines the constitutional checks on political participation restrictions.
B. Constitutional Checks
1. Theoretical Model
The equal protection clause 3 is the most effective check on the
states' power to regulate political participation.3 5 There were early,
24. Id. § 9.
25. The 1972 Constitution contains few election restrictions, leaving the matter almost
entirely to the legislature. MoNT. CONST. art. IV, § 3 requires the legislature to enact require-
ments for adminstration of elections which shall secure their purity and guard against
abuses.
26. But see MCA § 7-3-4346(1) (1978) which required city-county commissioners to
own real property worth at least $1000. This statute was repealed by the 1979 Legislature.
See note 6 supra.
27. Accord, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 363 (1970).
28. 339 F. Supp. 498, 499 (D.Md. 1972).
29. MCA § 35-20-302(2) (1979).
30. MCA § 76-1-221(1)(d) (1979).
31. MCA § 35-16-302(1) (1979) provides that members of agricultural associations
must hold title to land, MCA § 35-16-201 (1979) provides that only holders of title to land
may incorporate into agricultural associations, and MCA § 35-16-313 (1979) allows only
members or stockholders to vote.
32. MCA § 7-14-2601(1) (1979).
33. MCA § 7-33-2101 (1979).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that "[n]o State shall ...deny to any
person . . . the equal protection of the laws."
35. L. TmIE, AMERCAN CONsTrruTONAL LAw 763 (1978).
4
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unsuccessful attempts to identify voting" and candidacy 37 as privi-
leges of United States citizenship which states may not abridge. 31
The equal protection clause, however, provided the Warren Court's
authority to strip away most of the invidious state restrictions dur-
ing the 1960's. Once characterized as "the last resort of constitu-
tional arguments,"' 3' equal protection has become one of the most
important vehicles for the protection of individual rights against
the tyranny of majority rule. Equal protection is a particularly ap-
pealing constitutional argument because it embodies the idea of
fairness which is at the heart of American democracy. Equal pro-
tection deals with legislative line-drawing and tests the method the
government chooses to achieve an end.
The Court has developed at least two standards of review in
equal protection analysis. General economic and social welfare leg-
islation is subject to lower level review." Here the Court looks for a
rational relationship between the end desired and the legislative
means employed to achieve it. If the Court can hypothesize that
the legislature could reasonably conclude that the legislation would
achieve the end desired, the legislation is upheld." Under "strict
scrutiny" analysis the Court demands that the government demon-
strate that it is pursuing a compelling interest.'2 Strict scrutiny is
triggered by legislative infringement on fundamental rights, 3 or by
legislation which discriminates on some suspect basis." The Court
demands that a greater interest be served by such legislation be-
cause of the greater potential for infringement on individual
rights."
2. Applied Equal Protection
The foregoing analysis presents the theoretical model for a
two-tier treatment of equal protection problems. Political partici-
36. E.g., Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162, 171 (1875).
37. E.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that "[n]o State shall make ... any law
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States."
39. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
40. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAItv. L. REv. 1065, 1087 (1969);
TamE, supra note 35, at 1000.
41. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); TRiBE,
supra note 35, at 995; Developments-Equal Protection, supra note 40, at 1083.
42. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) where the Court
noted that "[piressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such [race]
restrictions."
43. Developments-Equal Protection, supra note 40, at 1121.
44. Id. at 1088; TamE, supra note 35, at 1002.
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pation restrictions have been subject to both levels of equal protec-
tion analysis. Voting restrictions have been invalidated, on the one
hand, because voting was said to be a fundamental right."6 On the
other hand, voting restrictions were upheld in another case which
did not accord fundamental status to voting. 7 Some litigants at-
tempted to characterize freeholder restrictions as suspect wealth
classifications."8 Others tried to use the right to vote"9 or the right
to associates to secure fundamental status for the right to be a can-
didate.5 1 Once the level of review was set, freeholder restrictions
have been found to be both rationally related" and not related at
all to a state interest.53 So, even though the Court has never found
a freeholder restriction which could withstand strict scrutiny, 4
there is no single accepted method of equal protection analysis.
Before we apply this analysis to Montana's freeholder statutes,
it is important to note that equal protection analysis as applied by
the Court does not perfectly conform with the model. Equal protec-
tion decisions, especially on voting rights, have been called result-
oriented, unpredictable, and inconsistent.5" Some commentators
suggest that the Court should abandon its complex equal protec-
tion mechanism for a recognition that value judgments are re-
quired.5 Others have suggested that recent cases demonstrate that
the Court is indeed reverting to a sliding-scale approach in which
the Court balances competing interests."7 Future decisions in this
area, therefore, may not be easily classified, although the Court's
recognition of the need for value judgments could improve
predictability.
46. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
47. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 732 (1973).
48. Developments-Elections, supra note 19, at 1221 n.19.
49. Even though there is no specific constitutional right to vote, the Court has fash-
ioned a fundamental right to vote from the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lubin v. Panish,
415 U.S. 709, 721 (1974); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
50. The right of association is a corollary of the First Amendment's protection of free-
dom of speech. See generally NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
51. See generally Leclerq, supra note 4, at 625; Gordon, The Constitutional Right to
Candidacy, 25 U. KA. L. REV. 545, 546 n.9 (1977).
52. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 731 (1973).
53. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 363 (1970).
54. Indeed, very few statutes survive strict scrutiny. Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
55. See, e.g., Comment, A Case Study in Equal Protection: Voting Rights Decisions
and a Plea for Consistency, 70 Nw. U.L. REy. 934, 934 (1976).
56. Id. at 964; see generally text following note 72 infra.
57. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
[Vol. 41
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II. FREEHOLDER VOTING RESTRICTIONS
A. United States Supreme Court Treatment
Half of the sixteen Constitutional amendments adopted since
1791 deal with voting or the electoral process. 5 The right to vote
has been called the most precious of all our rights" and "preserva-
tive of other basic civil and political rights." 0 Voting seems funda-
mental to our system of participatory democracy. If voting is a fun-
damental right, voting restrictions should trigger strict scrutiny
under equal protection analysis. This in turn should lead to the
invalidation of voting restrictions which do not serve a compelling
state interest. A number of decisions beginning with Avery v. Mid-
land County," however, suggest that the right to vote is fundamen-
tal only in general interest elections.
Avery extended the "one man, one vote" reapportionment de-
cision in Reynolds v. Sims"2 to local government units with general
governmental powers. Neither decision was unanimous; Justice
Harlan dissented in both. In another dissent, in Hadley v. Junior
College District,3 Harlan emphasized his concern that the Court's
interference in local government affairs was impeding the role of
state and local governments as laboratories for social experimenta-
tion, and that "the greater diversity of functions performed by lo-
cal governmental units creates a greater need for flexibility . . 4
Harlan's persuasive dissent led to the majority's recognition that
there might be elections in which Reynolds would not apply.65 The
Court found such an election in 1973 in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Water District." Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, ap-
plied lower level scrutiny to a California statute limiting to land-
owners the right to vote on a water storage district's activities. The
right to vote was not fundamental in this election because the
water district did not exercise general governmental functions and
only indirectly affected the plaintiff challenger. 7
The Court had used strict scrutiny to invalidate property own-
ership restrictions on voting several times before Salyer was de-
58. U.S. CONST. amends. XII, XV, XVII, XIX, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI.
59. Wesberry v. Saunders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
60. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
61. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
62. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
63. 397 U.S. 50, 59 (1970)(Harlan, J. dissenting).
64. Id. at 66-67.
65. Id. at 56.
66. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
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cided. Hill v. Stone"8 illustrates this line of authority. In Hill the
Court summarized its stance:
[Als long as the election in question is not one of special in-
terest, any classification restricting the franchise on grounds other
than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand unless the dis-
trict or state can demonstrate that the classification serves a corn-
pelling state interest."
Hayward v. Clay, 0 in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
invalidated a South Carolina statute conditioning an annexation
election upon a majority vote of affected landowners, typifies the
current application of this basic principle.
The key, therefore, to assessing the constitutionality of free-
holder voting restrictions is whether the election is of general or
special interest. Although the Court has not provided a clear test
for distinguishing the two, the distinction is crucial because no
landowner restriction on the franchise has ever passed strict scru-
tiny." The Salyer Court found that the water district election was
of special interest because the district lacked certain governmental
powers and because the district's activities would only indirectly
affect the non-landowning challenger." In Hadley, however, a jun-
ior college district election was found to be a general election even
though the powers exercised were arguably less than those of the
Salyer water district." As to direct effect, surely the power to con-
struct a dam and flood a valley has at least a potentially greater
effect on a resident than the power to run a junior college in his
city. The Court is making value judgments. Despite the complex
analytical framework constructed for equal protection analysis, the
Court is engaged in interest balancing. Value judgments and inter-
est balancing are not all bad; indeed, seasoned judgment is the ba-
sis of justice. The foregoing analysis does suggest that there are in-
68. 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
69. Id. at 297.
70. 573 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1978).
71. See text accompanying note 54 supra. The Court has never accepted any state
assertion of a compelling interest. States have asserted that landowners will better inform
themselves, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 631 (1969), are more respon-
sible fiscally, Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704-05(1969), and that a freeholder
requirement helps tax enforcement, Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 299 (1975).
72. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
73. Compare Hadley, 397 U.S. 50, 53 (junior college district could levy taxes, issue
bonds, hire and fire teachers, make contracts, supervise and discipline students, annex
school districts, and condemn property) with Salyer, 410 U.S. 719, 723-24, 728 n.7 (water
district could levy taxes, issue bonds, hire and fire staff, make contracts, condemn property,
plus build dams, levees and irrigation works, generate and distribute hydroelectric power,
and fix water rates).
[Vol. 41
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fluences besides theoretical equal protection analysis in any
political participation decision.
B. Application to Montana Law
Only one Montana statute directly burdens the right to vote
with a freeholder requirement. 4 More common is a freeholder re-
striction on the right of petition, which indirectly restricts the right
to vote.15 Montana's 1979 Legislature removed freeholder voting re-
strictions from four statutes, 6 leaving a direct freeholder voting re-
striction only in agricultural association elections." However, this
remaining restriction is constitutionally permissible since the bene-
fits and burdens of agricultural associations fall mainly on a dis-
tinctly indentifiable group of voters."8
Another indirect voting restriction is imposed by a group of
statutes which limits to freeholders the ability to protest and thus
to prevent annexation of land by an adjacent city. 9 Annexation is a
perennial Montana problem; one of these statutes has survived nu-
merous constitutional challenges before the Montana Supreme
Court. 0 Allowing landowners to protest annexation effectively per-
mits them to vote on overturning a city's decision to annex. In es-
sence, this is an annexation election in which only landowners can
vote. 8' Since annexation would result in a complete change in local
government for residents of the area to be annexed, this is a general
election." The freeholder voting restriction is invalid unless it
serves some compelling state interest. No state has ever met this
burden.83
74. MCA § 35-16-311 (1979).
75. See text accompanying notes 81 and 109 infra.
76. MCA §§ 7-5-4321(2), -6-2344(1), -4431(1), -14-4404. See note 6 supra.
77. MCA § 35-16-311 (1979).
78. Accord, Salyer, 410 U.S. at 729.
79. MCA §§ 7-2-4313(2), -4314(2), -4323(2), -4324(2), -4710(1), (2) (1979). MCA §§ 7-2-
4741(1), -4751(1) (1979) (allow only landowners to petition for court review of annexation
decisions.
80. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) § 11-403(1) (now codified at MCA § 7-2-4314(2)
(1979)) allows a majority of resident freeholders to veto the annexation of contiguous lands
by first class cities. The statute survived constitutional attacks in Burritt v. City of Butte,
161 Mont. 530, 541, 508 P.2d 563, 569 (1973); Brodie v. City of Missoula, 155 Mont. 185, 194-
95, 468 P.2d 778, 783 (1970); Calvert v. City of Great Falls, 154 Mont. 213, 220-21, 462 P.2d
182, 186 (1969); Harrison v. City of Missoula, 146 Mont. 420, 426, 407 P.2d 703, 706 (1965).
81. Note, however, that this may be a single issue election. Different standards are
applicable to single issue elections, where voter will is expressed directly rather than through
elected representatives. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259,
266 (1977). See also TRiaE, supra note 35, at 772-73.
82. Accord, Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
959 (1978).
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The freeholder restriction in these statutes actually deters,
rather than serves, a compelling state interest. The Montana Su-
preme Court has recognized that easing annexation promotes a
compelling state interest.8 ' Opening the annexation election to non-
landowners should make annexation easier since non-landowner re-
sidents of an area to be annexed will arguably favor annexation.
They stand to gain city services but will only indirectly bear the
cost of providing such services. s5 The compelling state interest in
easing annexation is thus served by removing, rather than retain-
ing, the freeholder restrictions.
III. FREEHOLDER CANDIDACY RESTRICTIONS
The right to be a candidate is not generally accorded the fun-
damental status that the right to vote enjoys." This, plus the fact
that freeholder restrictions on candidacy fail to meet even the
lower tier rational relation standard,87 simplifies the constitutional
considerations. Indeed, commentators suggest that all such candi-
dacy restrictions are unconstitutional." Two Montana freeholder
candidacy restrictions have already been declared unconstitu-
tional;8 9 Montana's 1979 Legislature removed freeholder restrictions
from four candidacy statutes.90 It would seem logical that the five
remaining statutes, limiting to freeholders the right to be trustees
of cemetery care and improvement associations,9 directors of agri-
cultural associations, 2 and citizen members of city,9 3 county,9' or
city-county95 planning boards are unconstitutional. But their fate is
84. Burritt v. City of Butte, 161 Mont. 530, 541, 508 P.2d 563, 569 (1973). The Mon-
tana Legislature expressed a similar philosophy in MCA § 7-2-4502 (1979), which allows
cities of the first class to annex wholly surrounded lands without regard to freeholder protest.
85. The Court has recognized that renters do, albeit indirectly, bear the burden of real
property taxes. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 210-11 (1970). Note that free-
holders may elect not to receive city services when their land is annexed. MCA §§ 7-2-4205, -
4305, -4409, -4506, -4610 (1979).
86. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972).
87. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 363 (1970).
88. Developments-Elections, supra note 19, at 1223; Accord, Leclerq, supra note 4, at
652.
89. MCA § 7-3-4346(1) (1978) allowed only freeholders to become city-county commis-
sioners and was declared unconstitutional in Warden v. City of Bozeman, Memorandum No.
2341 (D.Mont., Butte Division, 1973). MCA § 7-4-4401(1) (1978) allowed only freeholders to
become aldermen and was declared unconstitutional in Sadler v. Connolly, - Mont. -, 575
P.2d 51, 54 (1978). Both statutes were amended by the 1979 Legislature. See note 6 supra.
90. MCA §§ 7-3-4346(1), -4-4301(1)(a), -4401(1), -35-2108(2) (1978). See note 6 supra.
91. MCA § 35-20-302(2) (1979).
92. MCA §§ 35-16-202(1)(d), -314(1) (1979).
93. MCA § 76-1-221(1)(d) (1979).
94. MCA § 76-1-212(1) (1979).
95. MCA § 76-1-202(1) (1979).
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not so easily resolved.
First, allowing non-landowners to be directors of agricultural
associations is at least incongruous with the previous suggestion
that it is constitutionally permissible to allow only freeholders to
vote for them.9" Even though the Court found in Turner v. Fouche
that a freeholder statute bore no reasonable relation to a state in-
terest in limiting the ballot to interested candidates,97 it specifically
reserved the question of whether in other circumstances such stat-
utes might be constitutional. 8 This could be such a circumstance.
The state might well argue that only landowners are qualified
to deal with the unique problems inherent in agricultural associa-
tions, and that it would be foolish to let mere lessees run in elec-
tions where only landowners can -vote. On the other hand, lessees
too could be familiar with the problems of agricultural associations.
Further, since only landowners can vote for directors, landowners
are in a good position to ensure that their interests will be pro-
tected by the candidates they elect. Maintaining a freeholder re-
striction on voters, but not on candidates, is consistent with tradi-
tional American distrust for elected officials. This suggests that in
our system it is much more critical for the voter to be well-qualified
than the candidate.
A second consideration is a possible change in the standard of
review. Commentators have suggested 9 and lower courts have
held O that the right to be a candidate is a fundamental right, trig-
gering strict scrutiny of statutes which restrict it. The right to can-
didacy has been variously denoted as fundamental in itself, 0' as a
fundamental first amendment right, 10 and as inseparably inter-
twined with the fundamental right to vote. 10 3 Only in Turner has
the Court met the issue squarely;104 its reluctance to decide which
96. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
97. 396 U.S. at 363.
98. Id. at 364.
99. See, e.g., Leclerq, supra note 4, at 625; Gordon, supra note 51, at 552; Note, Dura-
tional Residency Requirements for State and Local Office: A Violation of Equal Protection?,
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 996, 1009 (1972); Note, Durational Residency Requirements for Candi-
dates, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 357, 369 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 196 (1st Cir. 1973); Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4
Cal.3d 716, 723, 484 P.2d 578, 581 (1971); McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F.Supp. 289, 294
(M.D.Ala. 1972).
101. Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wash.2d 547, 552, 496 P.2d 512, 515 (1972);
Cowan v. City of Aspen, 181 Colo. 343, 348, 509 P.2d 1269, 1272 (1973).
102. Minielly v. State, 242 Ore. 490, 499, 411 P.2d 69, 73 (1966); Fort v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 61 Cal.2d 331, 335, 392 P.2d 385, 387 (1964).
103. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43
(1972).
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level of scrutiny to apply has confused the lower courts. 05 Elevating
candidacy to a fundamental right would make a freeholder restric-
tion on agricultural association directors even more difficult to up-
hold, and would seal the fate of the other statutes discussed above.
A more plausible approach would be to denote the right to candi-
dacy as fundamental except in special elections. This was done
with voting'" and is consistent with the Court's observation that
voting and candidacy are closely related.07
IV. FREEHOLDER PETITIONING RESTRICTIONS
A. Application of Voting Analysis
By far the largest number of Montana freeholder statutes re-
strict to landowners the ability to petition local government for ex-
pansion or reduction of government services. In many instances, if
enough landowners sign petitions the government is obliged to
act.'"8 Like the annexation statutes previously examined, 9 these
statutes call for what are essentially elections in which only land-
owners can vote. Thus the standards discussed above on voting re-
strictions should be applicable. Most of the statutes involve the ad-
dition of land to or the creation of special improvement districts,
such as hospital, 10 cemetery,"' or rural fire districts."' Arguably,
these are special elections like that in Salyer and the freeholder
restrictions are valid. However, establishing a cemetery district or
the boundaries of a rural fire district is certainly of general interest
to non-landowner residents who use those services. A voting rights
attack is therefore subject to the same general/special election dis-
tinction problem discussed above."' A more fruitful method of at-
tack might be based on the right to petition for redress of griev-
ances, which enjoys specific constitutional protection."'
105. Gordon, supra note 51, at 571.
106. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
107. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
108. See, e.g., MCA § 7-14-2601(1) (1979) which provides that freeholders may petition
county to open roads; MCA § 7-14-2103(2) which provides that the duties of county commis-
sioners include opening roads for which freeholders petition, But cf. MCA § 7-21-3101 (1979)
which provides that county commissioners may establish public scales upon freeholder peti-
tion. When the government is not forced to act, these petitions seem less objectionable.
Still, the statutes give legal authority to landowner petitions which is denied to non-land-
owner petitions.
109. See text accompanying notes 79-85 supra.
110. MCA § 7-34-2152 (1979).
111. MCA § 7-35-2101(1)(a) (1979).
112. MCA § 7-33-2101 (1979).
113. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
114. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I states that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging...
the right of the people peaceably to . . . petition the government for a redress of
[Vol. 41
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B. Constitutional Right of Petition
The right of petition can be traced to the Magna Carta.) 5 The
right of petition is protected as one element of a broad right to
freedom of expression."' Since the prohibition against federal
abridgment of this first amendment right extends to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment,"7 a state must demonstrate
a compelling interest in regulating the freedom of petition."8 Free-
holder restrictions have never met a compelling interest test in vot-
ing or candidacy cases."' It also seems unlikely that the state could
meet such a burden here, especially since neither voting nor candi-
dacy enjoys the same constitutional recognition as the right of
petition.
This comment has suggested that a group of statutes allowing
only landowners to protest annexation is invalid."20 Those statutes
also seem vulnerable to First Amendment attack as unconstitutional
restrictions on the right of petition. Similarly, either method of at-
tack would invalidate freeholder restrictions on the right to petition
to seek annexation,' to create rural fire districts,'2 rural special
improvement districts, 12 or county planning districts,2 4 to open
public scales, 2 5 and to extend or change public roads. 21 Another
statute 7 provides three different methods for establishing free pub-
lic libraries, two of which restrict the right to petition to freehold-
ers or resident taxpayers. This freeholder restriction also appears to
be unconstitutional.' On the other hand, the state might be able
grievances."
115. 1 C. STEPHANSON AND F. MARcHAm, SoURcEs OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
126 (2d ed. 1975).
116. See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968); United Mine Workers v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1954); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
117. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939).
118. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
119. See note 54 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra.
121. MCA §§ 7-2-4601(3), -4705(2) (1979).
122. MCA § 7-33-2101 (1979). Other freeholder restrictions appear throughout Title 7,
Chapter 33, Part 21, of the MCA.
123. MCA § 7-12-2102 (1979).
124. MCA § 76-2-101(1) (1979). See also MCA §§ 76-1-505(1), -505(2) (1979) condition-
ing extension of city-county planning board jurisdictional area upon freeholder petition or
protest.
125. MCA § 7-21-3101 (1979).
126. MCA §§ 7-14-2103(2), -2103(3), -2601(1), -2611(1) (1979). Note that even though
only freeholders may petition to open roads, lessees may be required to pay for them. MCA §
7-14-2501(1) (1979).
127. MCA § 22-1-303 (1979).
128. The resident taxpayer qualification does, however, considerably widen the classifi-
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to assert a compelling interest in efficient land use to justify limit-
ing to abutting landowners the right to petition to abandon or va-
cate adjoining public land.'2 ' Still another statute allows cities of
the first class to annex wholly surrounded land regardless of free-
holder objections.'' In a comment which argues that freeholder re-
strictions are unconstitutional, there can be no objection to a stat-
ute which mandates disregard of freeholder protest.
CONCLUSION
State and local governments occupy a special place in the
American system of democracy. Described as laboratories for social
experimentation, these governments have generated ingenious and
fundamental ideas about how to better govern America. With this
freedom to be creative, however, comes the responsibility to adhere
to the basic constitutional principles which guide our country. Our
Constitution is no static document. Old ideas of who may respon-
sibly participate in the experiment of democracy must give way to
new interpretations of the right of political participation. Although
property rights are the foundation of American capitalism, the
United States Supreme Court has held that most landowner re-
strictions on the right of political participation are unconstitu-
tional. This method of defining interested citizens, then, has failed,
and states have the responsibility to eliminate these statutes from
their codes.
Legislatures have other responsibilities, however, apart from
purely constitutional considerations. A legislature has a unique po-
sition as the only branch of our government able to make laws. It
can encourage respect for and compliance with the institutions
with which we choose to govern by ensuring that legislation is cohe-
sive and up-to-date. The 1977 Montana Legislature can be proud of
the recodification it mandated. The 1979 Legislature removed free-
holder restrictions from nine statutes. The elimination of the addi-
tional freeholder restrictions discussed here would encourage
greater citizen participation in our democracy, foster greater re-
spect for our government, and promote peaceful resolution of social
conflicts. The 1981 Legislature has a unique opportunity to con-
cation. A resident taxpayer need not own land but must satisfy the residency requirements
in MCA § 1-1-215 (1979) and must be listed on the city or county assessment roll. See gener-
ally Mayer v. Sweeney, 22 Mont. 103, 106, 55 P. 913, 914 (1899) ("taxpaying freeholder"
need not pay real estate taxes; taxes on personalty are sufficient).
129. MCA §§ 7-5-2504, -14-2616(1), -2616(2) (1979) allow abutting freeholders to peti-
tion county commissioners for abandonment of public sites in unincorporated townsites.
MCA § 7-14-2601(1) (1979) allows freeholders to petition for abandonment of county roads.
130. MCA § 7-2-4502 (1979).
[Vol. 41
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tinue Montana's statutory reform by removing the freeholder re-
strictions from these statutes.
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